Chinese outbound direct investment (ODI) has been a controversial phenomenon and an increasingly important research topic. We argue that ignoring the role of international relations in Chinese outbound investment is an important oversight in the literature on the determinants of Chinese ODI. Building on the literature on international politics and FDI in general, we identify the mechanisms and reasons for why China's political relations with potential hosts significantly influence firm investment decisions and ODI flow patterns. A novel empirical contribution of the paper is to test the effects of interstate political relations on Chinese ODI using two interrelated and complementary empirical tests: one at the firm level based on survey responses of 346 Chinese investors and the other at the dyadic level based on Chinese ODI flows to some 95 countries from 2003 to 2005. We find that the more importance a Chinese firm attributes to interstate relations, the more likely its investment decisions will be affected and that Chinese ODI is more likely to flow to countries with which the Chinese government has better political relations. Our analysis also addresses the puzzle of why Chinese ODI tends to go to countries of high political risks. Chinese investors go to those environments, not because of their risk acceptant preferences, but rather because of the risk-reduction effect of good political relations. Scholars of Chinese ODI as well as FDI in general should note that international politics does matter to the distribution of international production capital. 
The rapid rise of China has reshaped the landscape of global politics and world economy over the past several decades. As the country grew into the second largest economy and the largest trading nation in the world, China now is not only the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among developing countries, but it also is a growingly important source of outbound direct investment (ODI) . From a negligible amount in the beginning of the 1980s, China's outbound investment rose by 329% from US$2,855 million in 2002 to $1,2261 million in 2005, and jumped by another 461% from 2005 to $6,8811 million in 2010. (MOFCOM, 2010) To understand how Chinese investment helped reshape the world economy, particularly the pattern of international capital flows, scholars in economics, business, and political economy have sought to identify the drivers and determinants of Chinese outbound investment. Most studies in this area have focused on host country conditions (e.g., natural resources, market size, growth potential, factor costs, and institutional environment) 1 and China's growing wealth and investment-promotion policies 2 . While some scholars (Wood and Brown, 2009 ) claim that it is impossible to understand Chinese outbound investment without understanding the external and domestic political pressures, extant studies have largely overlooked the potentially important role China's political relations with other countries could play. To the best of our knowledge, none of the statistical studies of Chinese outbound investment has estimated the effect of international relations on investment decisions and flows. Our paper fills this important gap. 1 See, e.g., Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; Cheung and Qian, 2009. 2 For example, Morck et al. (2007) assess the connections between the government and businesses in China, 2 For example, Morck et al. (2007) assess the connections between the government and businesses in China, confirming the important role of the government in shaping the landscape of Chinese outbound FDI. Gugler and Fetsherin (2010) links the motives of the Chinese government and investors, respectively, for different types of FDI, namely market-, efficiency-, natural resources-and strategic assets-seeking investments. Liang et al. (2011) reveals that the dominance of State ownership, combined with other unique industrial and corporate characteristics, leads to the specific strength of large Chinese overseas investors and some salient features of their internationalization strategies and practices; for instance, financial support from the state makes it feasible for Chinese companies to undertake extremely large cross-border M&As.
We believe that understanding the effect of China's political relations with other countries on its outbound investment could be very important. One concern over Chinese investment is how much politics matters vis-a-vis market forces. Part of this concern rests with China's standing in global politics. Theoretically, because of China's important role in global politics, the significance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Chinese overseas investment, and the extensive geographical spread of Chinese firms, it is especially important to take international political relations into account if we seek to better understand the determinants of Chinese outward FDI.
In addition, the role China's political relations play in determining its outbound investment may hold the key to one puzzle in the literature on Chinese investment. For instance, a number of empirical studies show that Chinese firms tend to invest in countries with high political risks (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012) , which contradicts the finding in most cross-national studies of FDI flows (Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003) . It is conceivable that Chinese firms invest in politically risky host countries because these countries tend to have good political relations with China, providing preferential treatment and protection of Chinese investors. Therefore, establishing the impact of China's political relations both theoretically and empirically may help resolve this important puzzle.
In our analysis, we build on a small but growing body of literature on how international politics influences foreign direct investment in international business and political science. This body of literature demonstrates that interstate political relations affect FDI flows through various causal mechanisms, such as influencing the perception, expectation, cost structure, and investment decisions of investing firms (Nigh, 1985; Li, 2006; Li, Vaschilko and Vaschilko, 2010) and impacting relevant government regulatory policies (Li and Vaschilko, 2010 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section examines various theoretical mechanisms that link international relations to FDI. The next section discusses why China's political relations should affect its outbound investment. The following section conducts two empirical analyses, and the last section concludes the paper with a summary of our findings and their implications.
Political Relations and Foreign Direct Investment: A Review of Causal Mechanisms
To explain the effect of interstate relations on Chinese outbound investment, we first set the analytical stage by briefly reviewing the theoretical mechanisms and related empirical evidence that link political relations and FDI in general. A small but growing body of literature studies the impact of international relations on foreign direct investment and identifies several causal mechanisms. One of the earliest arguments (Nigh 1985) posits that the political aspect of investment environment is driven by the subjective perception of investors from the home country. Since many home investors believe that host officials and citizens often fail to distinguish the interests of the government and investors from the same home country, investors themselves have to watch closely for interstate cooperation or conflict events that provide invaluable information about the business environment in a particular host country. As evidence, in a statistical analysis of manufacturing FDI by US firms to 24 countries over 21 years, Nigh (1985) finds that inter-nation conflicts reduce US investment while inter-nation cooperation increases it.
A second argument (Li, 2006 (Li, , 2008 Li (2006) finds that unanticipated interstate war reduces a country's chance as an investment location, but has little effect on the amount of FDI inflow.
A third argument (Li and Vaschilko, 2010) A fourth argument (Li, Vaschilko, and Vaschilko, 2010) considers the micro-foundation of the impact of interstate political relations. Since FDI crosses national borders and involves at least two political jurisdictions, bilateral political relations ought to influence the entry, exit and operation of international business. Using a firm-level theoretical model, they show that by changing the fixed and variable costs an affiliate faces in the host (such as cost of labor, raw materials, overhead, rent, property tax, insurance, and interest expenses), interstate cooperation lowers the productivity cutoff for firm entry from one home country but interstate conflict raises the productivity cutoff for firm entry from another home country. As such, even though the hostspecific risk (such as host-specific property rights protection) remains constant, different political relation-specific risks cause varying investment flows from different home countries.
How Do Political Relations Affect Chinese Outbound Investment?
Determinants of Chinese ODI include a wide range of factors at firm-, industry-, location-, country-, and dyadic-levels. These factors can be economic, cultural, demographical and political. At the country-and dyadic-levels, the focus are various home-and host-country characteristics and (geographical, culture and institutional) distances between home and host countries, while their political relations have often been overlooked. For relatively small home countries, the extent to which interstate political relations influence their FDI outflows may not be significant, but for large countries with strong political influence and a global presence, the omission of this factor in empirical studies on FDI flows may lead to misleading conclusions.
We argue that the causal mechanisms that link international relations to FDI reviewed in the previous section should particularly apply to Chinese ODI.
China is one of the major powers in global politics thanks to its growing economic strength and expanding global presence, its extensive diplomatic ties around the globe, as well as its strong position in global governance, as reflected for instance by its permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the country has been increasingly and more frequently involved in salient international conflicts and crises. Anecdotal evidence illustrates that ODI from China has been facing various non-commercial obstacles in industrialized countries and political risks in low-income countries where political conflicts and regime changes took place. Political obstacles to Chinese investments are often due to national security as well as employment concerns, targeting mainly large M&A deals in specific sensitive industries, such as oil and gas, infrastructure and high-tech industries (Liang 2011 of continuing to honor pre-conflict contracts from countries that opposed the rebel campaign (Osgood, 2011) .
A major share of FDI from China has been undertaken by SOEs, with a significant part in extractive industries (including oil, gas and metal mining), and such investment is often affected by political matters both at home and abroad. The state-owned nature endows these central SOEs with the "national champion" status and monopolistic power in their industries, which leads to their high financial returns. In addition, strong governmental support such as easy bank loans from the state-owned banking system provides central SOEs with a lot of financial slack to invest overseas. State ownership further enhances their motives to make proactive international investments . As a result, Chinese investments are sometimes considered to be motivated by political reasons in association with government agendas. Hence, host countries that have less favorable political relations with China are likely to guard against Chinese investments whereas other countries that have more favorable political relations with China are likely to welcome those investments.
Institutional theory suggests that firm behavior is deeply rooted in its environmental surroundings, and firm behavior needs to be explained on a situational basis (e.g., Scott, 1995) .
Indeed, in the case of Chinese outbound investment, investors often have to consider interstate relations when conducting feasibility studies for their investment projects and assessing the related political risks. They are likely to benefit from privileged intergovernmental political relations with particular regimes, leading to more preferential policy treatments and probably lower productivity cutoff for firm entry relative to potential competitors from other home countries. Conversely, they may face additional barriers to enter countries with which China have tense economic, political, and security relations. Boisot and Meyer (2008) suggest that
Chinese investors can leverage their institutional arbitrage when firms pursue efficient institutions outside their home country. It seems that good political relations between home and host countries can be a basis for such an activity.
Based on these discussions, we expect that Chinese firms are aware of the importance of interstate relations to their investment projects and that Chinese outbound investments are more likely to flow to host countries that have more cooperative relations with China.
Two Empirical Tests
Testing these expectations empirically is challenging. One main challenge is that the relevance of interstate relations--a dyadic level factor--is reflected by its influence on specific investment decisions--the firm level behavior. In the absence of modeling explicitly their causal link theoretically and empirically, we believe empirical evidence from both levels of analysis are necessary for reaching a coherent and convincing conclusion. Indeed, based on anecdotal evidence, recent studies (Hitt, et al., 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007) show that firms from emerging economies decide to invest overseas due to multilevel factors, calling for multilevel perspectives. This variable allows us to test whether interstate political relations have significantly affected a firm's decision to invest in a respective region or not. More specifically, because we expect good (bad) interstate political relations increase (reduce) the probability of investment, and because the question does not indicate the quality but only the importance of interstate political relations, the effect of the interstate relations variable could increase the probability of investment (in cases of good relations) or reduce the probability of investment (in cases of bad relations or in cases of relations inferior to those with other competing destination regions).
Hence, we expect the effect of the variable to be statistically different from zero, but its sign could be positive or negative. The more important the interstate political relations, the more likely decisions over investments in a region will be affected.
Our statistical model controls for a variety of factors included in the survey. These factors include the importance of fair and transparent regulatory environment, market potential, natural resources, skilled labor, low cost labor, access to advanced technology, access to international management practices, acquisition of established brands, access to public procurement markets, host preferential investment policies, trade barrier avoidance, Chinese firm presence, easiness of foreign market entry, host public subsidies, local labor union, host market as target, and host as export platform. These are all coded as dichotomous variables, with one indicating the relevant factor being important and zero otherwise.
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logit for model estimation. We also estimate White robust standard errors for these models.
[Insert Table 1 here] Taken together, Chinese investors appear to be sensitive to the impact of interstate political relations, but far less concerned about the overall regulatory environment of the host country, regardless of it being a developed or developing economy. This pattern is certainly consistent with the notion that interstate relations could be leveraged to compensate for a less desirable host-specific overall environment.
Dyadic level Analysis of Chinese Outbound Investment Flows
The firm level analysis above demonstrates that interstate political relations significantly affect the investment decisions of Chinese firms. One weakness of the analysis, however, is that the survey question only asks about the importance, rather than, the nature of the effect of interstate relations. In other words, the analysis does not tell us whether an improvement (or a deterioration) in interstate relations increases (or decreases) Chinese investment in a host country or not and if it does, how large the effect is in size. To answer these questions, we carry out a dyadic level analysis of whether and how the conflict and cooperation activities initiated by a particular host toward China affect Chinese direct investment flows into the country. This variable captures the market size of the host, encouraging market-seeking investments.
Growth is the host country's GDP annual growth, which also indicates the market potential of the economy. Mineral export measures the host's ores and metals exports as a percent of its merchandise exports, whereas fuel exports indicates the host's mineral fuel export as a percent of its merchandise exports. Both variables reflect the natural resource endowments in the host, which should encourage resource-seeking investments. All economic data are from the World Development Indicators (2011).
Distance is the log distance between China and the host country in terms of bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two countries, with the inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population. Colony is a dummy variable coded one if China and a host country ever had a colonial relationship before. Distance is likely to affect direct investments negatively whereas colonial ties may increase direct investments. Data on distance and colony are from CEPII database (2011).
Finally, we also include an indicator of property rights protection in host countries because cross-national studies of FDI flows have widely demonstrated its significant positive effect on investment (e.g., Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003) . However, as noted, empirical studies of Chinese ODI have provided contradictory evidence on this relationship. For example, statistical findings (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012) show Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with bad institutions (high political risk) or that host institutional quality has no effect (Cheung and Qian, 2009) . Given this contradiction, we need to control for host property rights protection in our model.
Our measure is based on four relevant indicators from Political Risk Service's Intercountry Risk Guide, including contract viability, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. All four indicators should measure and correlate with the latent level of property rights protection in the host. Consistent with the expectation, factor analysis of these four variables indicate that there is only one underlying dimension among these four indicators, which has an eigenvalue of 2.87 whereas all other factor loadings have eigenvalues way below the threshold of one. Hence, we use this factor loading to measure host property rights protection.
Our estimation involves several technical issues. First, we estimate the primary models using OLS regression with Huber-White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation (Williams, 2000) . Second, to mitigate the potential risk of reverse causality, we lag all the right-hand side variables one year behind the dependent variable, as is done in many studies.
Third, Blonigen and Wang (2004) argue that to avoid spurious findings, it is important to run separate analyses for highly developed and less developed economies. Hence, like in Li and
Vaschilko (2010), we estimate models for three samples, one for all countries in the sample, a second one for the high-low income ones with at least $12000 real GDP per capita, and a third one for the low income ones with real GDP per capita below $12,000.
For robustness check, we also include the lagged dependent variable in some of the models for two reasons. One reason is that foreign direct investments often exhibit inertia and path dependence, which the lagged dependent variable helps to control for. Another reason is that it controls for the impact of various other unobserved relevant variables not included in the model.
Finally, for further robustness check, we also include the host country fixed effects dummies for two samples (all countries and low-income ones) to control for the impact of unobserved confounding factors such as national structural variables and attributes. The fixed effects model for high-income countries is not estimable due to insufficient observations. It is worth noting that while the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effects country dummies help to ensure our findings are not spurious, they do impose serious costs. It is well known that they soak up the variations in the dependent variable that could otherwise be explained by other independent variables. This makes it very difficult for us to find statistically significant results.
While this approach to empirical modeling is conservative, significant findings from such models are more likely to be robust and reliable. Table 2 presents the results from eleven regression models of Chinese outbound investment flows. Models 1-3 5 include the baseline model specification for three samples (all countries, low income, and high income), respectively. Models 4-6 are models 1-3 plus two additional variables (fuel exports and mineral exports). Models 7-9 are models 4-6 plus the lagged dependent variable. Models 10-11 are models 7-8 plus country fixed effects.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The results in Table 2 provide strong support for our theoretical expectation of the role of interstate political relations on Chinese foreign investment abroad. Across all eleven models, interstate political relations have a positive effect as expected. And the effect is statistically different from zero in all but two models (6 and 11). Even for the two models with an insignificant effect, the p-value is not too far away from statistical significance. And in model 11, none of the variables in the model has statistically significant effects due to high collinearity.
These results suggest that Chinese foreign direct investments abroad are more likely to flow to countries with which the Chinese government has better political relations. The findings provide consistent and complementary support for the firm level analysis in the previous section regarding the role of interstate relations for firm investment decisions.
The size of effect of the net cooperation variable in Table 2 is substantively important.
The size of effect ranges from 0.433 to 0.875 across the four models based on the all countries sample. Take These results again are consistent with the possibility that if Chinese investors have to invest in countries with poor institutional quality, they tend to go to those with which China has better political relations. To further examine the possibility, we calculate the correlation between property rights and interstate relations, which is -0.083 for the low-income sample in model 2, but +0.19 for the high-income sample in model 3. So within the low-income sample, the hosts with higher political risks tend to be more cooperative toward China. This compensation effect does not appear to be so with the high-income sample. The by-country averages for real ODI flows, property rights, and interstate relations in Appendix 2 appear to provide various cases that are consistent with these patterns.
In terms of other control variables the logged GDP has statistically significant positive effect in four of the eleven models, indicating some evidence that Chinese investments tend to flow to hosts with larger markets. The effects of host growth and geographical distance between
China and the host are largely statistically insignificant across the eleven models. In contrast, the colonial tie variable has statistically significant positive effect in all models that include the variable. Note that the variable's effect is not estimable in the high-income countries samples and the fixed effects models of 10 and 11. Chinese ODI is more likely to flow to those host countries with which China used to have a colonial relationship in the past.
The two natural resources variables, fuel export and mineral export, both have positive effects as expected. And except in the fixed effects models 6 , their effects are statistically significant or close to being significant in six out of eight models. Chinese overseas investments are often resource seeking, going into countries with rich oil and mineral resources. Finally, the lagged dependent variable has statistically significant positive effect in three of five models, and not surprisingly, its effect is insignificant in the two fixed effects models. Chinese foreign investments exhibit inertia and path dependence.
Conclusion
We 
